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Abstract— The behavior of a given wireless device may affect
the communication capabilities of a neighboring device, notably
because the radio communication channel is usually shared in
wireless networks. In this tutorial, we carefully explain how
situations of this kind can be modelled by making use of game
theory. By leveraging on four simple running examples, we
introduce the most fundamental concepts of non-cooperative
game theory. This approach should help students and scholars
to quickly master this fascinating analytical tool without having
to read the existing lengthy, economics-oriented books. It should
also assist them in modelling problems of their own.
1 INTRODUCTION
Game theory [9, 10, 17] is a discipline aimed at modeling
situations in which decision makers have to make specific
actions that have mutual, possibly conflicting, consequences.
It has been used primarily in economics, in order to model
competition between companies: for example, should a given
company enter a new market, considering that its competitors
could make similar (or different) moves? Game theory has also
been applied to other areas, including politics and biology.1
The first textbook in this area was written by von Neumann
and Morgenstern, in 1944 [24]. A few years later, John Nash
made a number of additional contributions [15, 16], the cor-
nerstone of which is the famous Nash equilibrium. Since then,
many other researchers have contributed to the field, and in a
few decades game theory has become a very active discipline;
it is routinely taught in economics curricula. An amazingly
large number of game theory textbooks have been produced,
but almost all of them consider economics as the premier
application area (and all their concrete examples are inspired
by that field). Our tutorial is inspired by three basic textbooks
and we mention them in the ascending order of complexity.
Gibbons [10] provides a very nice, easy-to-read introduction
to non-cooperative game theory with many examples using
economics. Osborne and Rubinstein [17] introduce the game-
theoretic concepts very precisely, although this book is more
difficult to read because of the more formal development. This
is the only book out of the three that covers cooperative game
theory as well. Finally, Fudenberg and Tirole’s [9] book covers
many advanced topics, in addition to the basic concepts.2
1The name itself of “game theory” can be slightly misleading, as it could be
associated with parlor games such as chess and checkers. Yet, this connection
is not completely erroneous, as parlor games do have the notion of players,
payoffs, and strategies - concepts that we will introduce shortly.
2Note that there exist books on the application of game theory to specific
topics in wireless networking, such as on routing [19].
Not surprisingly, game theory has also been applied to net-
working, in most cases to solve routing and resource allocation
problems in a competitive environment. The references are so
numerous that we cannot list them due to space constraints. A
subset of these papers is included in [1]. Recently, game theory
was also applied to wireless communication: the decision
makers in the game are rational users or networks operators
who control their communication devices. These devices have
to cope with a limited transmission resource (i.e., the radio
spectrum) that imposes a conflict of interests. In an attempt
to resolve this conflict, they can make certain moves such as
transmitting now or later, changing their transmission channel,
or adapting their transmission rate.
There is a significant amount of work in wired and wireless
networking that make use of game theory. Oddly enough,
there exists no comprehensive tutorial specifically written for
wireless networkers.3 We have wrote this tutorial with the
hope of contributing to fill this void. As game theory is still
rarely taught in engineering and computer science curricula,
we assume that the reader has no (or very little) background in
this field; therefore, we take a basic and intuitive approach. Be-
cause in most of the strategic situations in wireless networking
the players have to agree on sharing or providing a common
resource in a distributed way, our approach focuses on the
theory of non-cooperative games. Cooperative games require
additional signalization or agreements between the decision
makers and hence a solution based on them might be more
difficult to realize.
In a non-cooperative game, there exist a number of deci-
sion makers, called players,4 who have potentially conflicting
interests. In the wireless networking context, the players are
the users or network operators controlling their devices. In
compliance with the practice of game theory, we assume that
the players are rational, which means that they try to maximize
their payoffs (or utilities). This assumption of rationality is
often questionable, given, for example, the altruistic behavior
of some animals. Herbert A. Simon was the first one was to
question this assumption and introduced the notion of bounded
rationality [23]. But, we believe that in computer networks,
most of the interactions can be captured using the concept
3To the best of our knowledge, there exist only two references: a monograph
[14] that provides a synthesis of lectures on the topic, and a survey [1] that
focuses mostly on wired networks.
4Note that there exists no convention to refer to the players with a particular
gender. In this work, we will use the male pronouns following the basic
textbooks [9, 17].
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Figure 1. The network scenario in the Forwarder’s Dilemma game.
of rationality, with the appropriate adjustment of the payoff
function. In order to maximize their payoff, the players act
according to their strategies. The strategy of a player can be
a single move (as we will see in Section 2) or a set of moves
during the game (as we present in Section 4).
In this tutorial, we devote particular attention to the selection
of the examples so that they match our focus on wireless
networks. For the sake of clarity, and similarly to classic
examples, we define these examples for two decision makers,
hence the corresponding games are two-player games. For
each of the examples, we highlight a corresponding research
contribution that models the same problem in a more complex
scenario. As we demonstrate in this thesis, the application of
game theory extends far beyond two-person games. Indeed, in
most networking problems, there are several participants.
We take an intuitive top-down approach in the protocol stack
to select the examples in wireless networking as follows. Let
us first assume that the time is split into time steps and each
device can make one move in each time step.
1) In the first game called the Forwarder’s Dilemma,5 we
assume that there exist two devices as players, p1 and
p2. Each of them wants to send a packet to his desti-
nation6, dst1 and dst2 respectively, in each time step
using the other player as a forwarder. We assume that
the communication between a player and his receiver
is possible only if the other player forwards the packet.
We show the Forwarder’s Dilemma scenario in Figure 1.
If player p1 forwards the packet of p2, it costs player
p1 a fixed cost 0 < C << 1, which represents the
energy and computation spent for the forwarding action.
By doing so, he enables the communication between p2
and dst2, which gives p2 a benefit7 of 1. The payoff is
the difference of the benefit and the cost. We assume that
the game is symmetric and the same reasoning applies to
the forwarding move of player p2. The dilemma is the
following: Each player is tempted to drop the packet he
should forward, as this would save some of his resources;
but if the other player reasons in the same way, then
the packet that the first player wanted to send will also
be dropped. They could, however, do better by mutually
forwarding each other’s packet. Hence the dilemma.
2) In the second example, called Joint Packet Forwarding
5We have chosen this name as a tribute to the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma
game in the classic literature [2, 10, 9, 17].
6Note that in the networking context, wireless engineers use the terms
source and destination to refer to the endpoints to a given network flow.
In case of a direct transmission between two devices, the terms sender and
receiver are used.
7Note that we introduce the concept of benefit to express the positive results
for a given player in the game. Hence, the concept of benefit should be
interpreted as “something that contributes to or increases one’s well-being.”
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Figure 2. The Joint Packet Forwarding Game.
Game, we present a scenario, in which a source src wants
to send a packet to his destination dst in each time step.
To this end, he needs both devices p1 and p2 to forward
for him. Similarly to the previous example, there is a
forwarding cost 0 < C << 1 if a player forwards the
packet of the sender. If both players forward, then they
each receive a benefit of 1 (e.g., from the sender or the
receiver). We show this packet forwarding scenario in
Figure 2.
3) The third example, called Multiple Access Game,8 intro-
duces the problem of medium access. Suppose that there
are two players p1 and p2 who want to access a shared
communication channel to send some packets to their
receivers re1 and re2. We assume that each player has
one packet to send in each time step and he can decide to
access the channel to transmit it or to wait. Furthermore,
let us assume that p1, p2, re1 and re2 are in the power
range of each other, hence their transmissions mutually
interfere. If player p1 transmits his packet, it incurs a
sending cost of 0 < C << 1. The packet is successfully
transmitted if p2 waits in that given time step (i.e., he
does not transmit), otherwise there is a collision. If there
is no collision, player p1 gets a benefit of 1 from the
successful packet transmission. The framework presented
by Cˇagalj et al. in [4] is a generalized version of the
Multiple Access Game.
4) In the last example, called the Jamming Game9, we
assume that player p1 wants to send a packet in each
time step to a receiver re1. In this example, we assume
that the wireless medium is split into two channels x and
y according to the Frequency Division Multiple Access
(FDMA) principle [18, 21]. The objective of the mali-
cious player p2 is to prevent player p1 from a successful
transmission by transmitting on the same channel in the
given time step. In wireless communication, this is called
jamming. Clearly, the objective of p1 is to succeed in spite
of the presence of p2. Accordingly, he receives a payoff
of 1 if the attacker cannot jam his transmission and he
receives a payoff of −1 if the attacker jams his packet.
The payoffs for the attacker p2 are the opposite of those of
player p1. We assume that p1 and re1 are synchronized,
which means that re1 can always receive the packet,
unless it is destroyed by the malicious player p2. Note
that we neglect the transmission cost C, since it applies to
each payoff (i.e., the payoffs would be 1−C and −1−C)
and does not change the conclusions drawn from this
game. The Jamming Game models the simplified version
8In the classic game theory textbooks, this type of game is referred to as
the “Hawk-Dove” game, or sometimes the “Chicken” game.
9In the classic game theory literature, this game corresponds to the game
of “Matching Pennies.”
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Figure 3. The classification of the examples according to protocol layers.
of a game-theoretic problem presented by Zander in [25].
We deliberately chose these examples to represent a wide
range of problems over different protocol layers (as shown in
Figure 3). There are indeed fundamental differences between
these games as follows. The Forwarder’s Dilemma is a sym-
metric nonzero-sum game, because the players can mutually
increase their payoffs by cooperating (i.e., from zero to 1−C).
The conflict of interest is that they have to provide the packet
forwarding service for each other. Similarly, the players have
to establish the packet forwarding service in the Joint Packet
Forwarding Game, but they are not in a symmetric situation
anymore. The Multiple Access Game is also a nonzero-sum
game, but the players have to share a common resource, the
wireless medium, instead of providing it. Finally, the Jamming
Game is a zero-sum game because the gain of one player
represents the loss of the other player. These properties lead
to different games and hence to different strategic analyses, as
we will demonstrate in the next section.
2 STATIC GAMES
In this section, we assume that there exists only one time
step, which means that the players have only one move as
a strategy. In game-theoretic terms, this is called a single-
stage or static game. Please note that the definition of a static
game means that the players have only one move as a strategy,
but this does not necessarily correspond to the time slot of
an underlying networking protocol. We will demonstrate how
game theory can be used to analyze the games introduced
before and to identify the possible outcomes of the strategic
interactions of the players.
2.1 Static Games in Strategic Form
We define a game G = (N ,S,U) in strategic form (or
normal form) by the following three elements. N is the set
of players. Note that in this chapter we have two players,
p1, p2 ∈ N , but we present each definition such that it
holds for any number of players. For convenience, we will
designate by subscript −i all the players belonging to N
except i himself. These players are often designated as being
the opponents of i. In our games, player i has one opponent
referred to as j. Si corresponds to the pure strategy space of
player i. This means that the strategy assigns zero probability
to all moves, except one (i.e., it clearly determines the move
to make). We will see in Section 2.4, that the players can also
use mixed strategies, meaning that they choose different moves
with different probabilities. We designate the joint set of the
strategy spaces of all players as follows S = S1× · · · × S|N |.
We will represent the pure strategy space of the opponents
of player i by S−i = S\Si. The set of chosen strategies
constitutes a strategy profile s = {s1, s2}. In this tutorial, we
have the same strategy space for both players, thus S1 = S2.
Note that our examples have two players and thus we refer to
the strategy profile of the opponents as s−i = sj ∈ S . The
payoff 10 or utility ui(s) quantifies the outcome of the game
for player i given the strategy profile s. In our examples,
we have U = {u1(s), u2(s)}. Note that the objectives (i.e.,
payoff functions) might be different for the two players, as
for example in the Jamming Game.
At this point of the discussion, it is very important to
explicitly state that we consider the game to be with complete
information.
Definition 1 A game with complete information is a game in
which each player knows the game G = (N ,S,U), notably
the set of players N , the set of strategies S and the set of
payoff functions U .
The concept of complete information should not be con-
fused with the concept of perfect information, another concept
we present in detail in Section 3.3.
Let us first study the Forwarder’s Dilemma in a static game.
As mentioned before, in the static game we have only one time
step. The players can decide to forward (F ) the packet of the
other player or to drop it (D); this decision represents the
strategy of the player. As mentioned earlier, this is a nonzero-
sum game, because by helping each other to forward, they can
achieve an outcome that is better for both players than mutual
dropping.
Matrices provide a convenient representation of strategic-
form games with two players. We can represent the For-
warder’s Dilemma game as shown in Table I. In this table, p1
is the row player and p2 is the column player. Each cell of the
matrix corresponds to a possible combination of the strategies
of the players and contains a pair of values representing the
payoffs of players p1 and p2, respectively.
p2
F D
p1
F (1-C,1-C) (-C,1)
D (1,-C) (0,0)
Table I. The Forwarder’s Dilemma game in strategic form, where p1 is the
row player and p2 is the column player. Each of the players has two strategies:
to forward (F ) or to drop (D) the packet of the other player. In each cell,
the first value is the payoff of player p1, whereas the second is the payoff of
player p2.
2.2 Iterated Dominance
Once the game is expressed in strategic form, it is usually
interesting to solve it. Solving a game means predicting the
strategy of each player, considering the information the game
offers and assuming that the players are rational. There are
10The notation we use to denote payoffs / utilities corresponds to the
conventional notation of many game theory textbooks [9, 10, 17].
4several possible ways to solve a game; the simplest one
consists in relying on strict dominance.
Definition 2 Strategy s
′
i of player i is said to be strictly
dominated by his strategy si if,
ui(s
′
i, s−i) < ui(si, s−i), ∀s−i ∈ S−i (1)
Coming back to the example of Table I, we solve the game
by iterated strict dominance (i.e., by iteratively eliminating
strictly dominated strategies). If we consider the situation from
the point of view of player p1, then it appears that for him
the F strategy is strictly dominated by the D strategy. This
means that we can eliminate the first row of the matrix, since
a rational player p1 will never choose this strategy. A similar
reasoning, now from the point of view of player p2, leads to
the elimination of the first column of the matrix. As a result,
the solution of the game is (D, D) and the payoffs are (0,
0). This can seem quite paradoxical, as the pair (F , F ) would
have led to a better payoff for each of the players. It is the
lack of trust between the players that leads to this suboptimal
solution.
The technique of iterated strict dominance cannot be used
to solve every game. Let us now study the Joint Packet
Forwarding Game. The two devices have to decide whether to
forward the packet simultaneously, before the source actually
sends it.11 Table II shows the strategic form.
p2
F D
p1
F (1-C,1-C) (-C,0)
D (0,0) (0,0)
Table II. The Joint Packet Forwarding Game in strategic form. The players
have two strategies: to forward (F ) or to drop (D) the packet sent by the
sender. Both players p1 and p2 get a benefit, but only if each of them forwards
the packet.
In the Joint Packet Forwarding Game, none of the strategies
of a certain player strictly dominates the other. If player p1
drops the packet, then the move of player p2 is indifferent
and thus we cannot eliminate his strategy D based on strict
dominance. To overcome the requirements defined by strict
dominance, we define the concept of weak dominance.
Definition 3 Strategy s
′
i of player i is said to be weakly
dominated by his strategy si if,
ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i),∀s−i ∈ S−i (2)
with strict inequality for at least one s−i ∈ S−i.
Using the concept of weak dominance, one can notice that
the strategy D of player p2 is weakly dominated by the strategy
F . One can perform an elimination based on iterated weak
dominance, which results in the strategy profile (F , F ). Note,
however, that the solution of the iterated strict dominance
technique is unique, whereas the solution of the iterated
weak dominance technique might depend on the sequence of
11In Section 3, we will show that the game-theoretic model and its solution
changes if we consider a sequential move of the players (i.e., if player p2
knows the move of player p1 at the moment he makes a move).
eliminating weakly dominated strategies, as explained at the
end of Section 2.3.
It is also important to emphasize that the iterated elimination
techniques are very useful, even if they do not result in a single
strategy profile. These techniques can be used to reduce the
size of the strategy space (i.e., the size of the strategic-form
matrix) and thus to ease the solution process.
2.3 Nash Equilibrium
In general, the majority of the games cannot be solved by the
iterated dominance techniques. As an example, let us consider
the Multiple Access Game introduced at the beginning. Each
of the players has two possible strategies: either access the
channel (i.e., to transmit) (A) or wait (W ). As the channel
is shared, a simultaneous transmission of both players leads
to a collision. The game is represented in strategic form in
Table III.
p2
W A
p1
W (0,0) (0,1-C)
A (1-C,0) (-C,-C)
Table III. The Multiple Access Game in strategic form. The two moves for
each player are: access (A) or wait (W ).
It can immediately be seen that no strategy is dominated
in this game. To solve the game, let us introduce the concept
of best response. If player p1 accesses the channel, then the
best response of player p2 is to wait. Conversely, if player
p2 waits, then p1 is better off transmitting a packet. We can
write bri(s−i), the best response of player i to an opponents’
strategy vector s−i as follows.
Definition 4 The best response bri(s−i) of player i to the
profile of strategies s−i is a strategy si such that:
bri(s−i) = arg max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i) (3)
One can see, that if two strategies are mutual best responses
to each other, then no player would have a reason to deviate
from the given strategy profile. In the Multiple Access Game,
two strategy profiles exist with the above property: (W , A) and
(A, W ). To identify such strategy profiles in general, Nash
introduced the concept of Nash equilibrium in his seminal
paper [15]. We can formally define the concept of Nash
equilibrium (NE) as follows.
Definition 5 The pure strategy profile s∗ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if, for each player i,
ui(s∗i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si (4)
This means that in a Nash equilibrium, none of the users
can unilaterally change his strategy to increase his payoff. Al-
ternatively, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile comprised
of mutual best responses of the players.
A Nash equilibrium is strict [11] if we have:
ui(s∗i , s
∗
−i) > ui(si, s
∗
−i), ∀si ∈ Si (5)
5It is easy to check that (D, D) is a Nash equilibrium
in the Forwarder’s Dilemma game represented in Table I.
This corresponds to the solution obtained by iterated strict
dominance. This result is true in general: Any solution derived
by iterated strict dominance is a Nash equilibrium. The proof
of this statement is presented in [9]. In the Multiple Access
Game, however, the iterated dominance techniques do not
help us derive the solutions. Fortunately, using the concept of
Nash equilibrium, we can identify the two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria: (W , A) and (A, W ). Note that the best response
bri(s−i) is not necessarily unique. For example in the Joint
Packet Forwarding Game presented in Table II, player p2 has
two best responses (D or F ) to the move D of player p1.
2.4 Mixed Strategies
In the examples so far, we have considered only pure
strategies, meaning that the players clearly decide on one
behavior or another. But in general, a player can decide to play
each of these pure strategies with some probabilities; in game-
theoretic terms such a behavior is called a mixed strategy.
Definition 6 The mixed strategy σi(si), or shortly σi, of
player i is a probability distribution over his pure strategies
si ∈ Si.
Accordingly, we will denote the mixed strategy space of
player i by Σi, where σi ∈ Σi. Hence, the notion of
profile, which we defined earlier for pure strategies, is now
characterized by the probability distribution assigned by each
player to his pure strategies: σ = σ1, ..., σ|N |, where |N | is
the cardinality of N . As in the case of pure strategies, we
denote the strategy profile of the opponents by σ−i. For a
finite strategy space, i.e. for so called finite games12 [9] for
each player, player i’s payoff to profile σ is then given by:
ui(σ) =
∑
si∈|Si|
σi(si)ui(si, σ−i) (6)
Here, we rely on the assumption that the players want to
maximize their expected utility. Note that in real situations,
this assumption might not hold (see for instance the Ellsberg
paradox [5]).
Each of the concepts that we have considered so far for pure
strategies can be also defined for mixed strategies. As there is
no significant difference in these definitions, we refrain from
repeating them for mixed strategies.
Let us first study the Multiple Access Game. We call q1 the
probability with which player p1 decides to access the channel,
and q2 the equivalent probability for p2 (this means that p1
and p2 wait with probability 1− q1 and 1− q2, respectively).
The payoff of player p1 is:
u1 = q1(1− q2)(1− C)− q1q2C = q1(1− C − q2) (7)
Likewise, we have:
u2 = q2(1− C − q1) (8)
12The general formula for infinite strategy space is slightly more compli-
cated. The reader can find it in [9] or [17].
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Figure 4. Best response functions in the Multiple Access Game. The best
response function of player p1 (q1 as a function of q2) is represented by
the dashed line; that of player p2 (q2 as a function of q1) is represented
by the solid one. The two dots at the edges indicate the two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria and the one in the middle shows the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
As usual, the players want to maximize their payoffs. Let
us first derive the best response of p2 for each strategy of p1.
In (8), if q1 < 1−C, then (1−C − q1) is positive, and u2 is
maximized by setting q2 to the highest possible value, namely
q2 = 1. Conversely, if q1 > 1−C, u2 is maximized by setting
q2 = 0 (these two cases will bring us back to the two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria that we have already identified). More
interesting is the last case, namely q1 = 1− C, because here
u2 does not depend on q2 anymore (and is always equal to
0); hence, any strategy of p2 (meaning any value of q2) is a
best response. The game being symmetric, reversing the roles
of the two players leads of course to the same result. This
means that (q1 = 1−C, q2 = 1−C) is a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium for the Multiple Access Game.
We can graphically represent the best responses of the two
players as shown in Figure 4. In the graphical representation,
we refer to the set of best response values as the best response
function.13 Relying on the concept of mutual best responses,
one can identify the Nash equilibria as the crossing points of
these best response functions.
Note that the number of Nash equilibria varies from game
to game. There are games with no pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium, such as the Jamming Game. We show the strategic form
of this game in Table IV.
p2 (jammer)
x y
p1 (sender)
x (-1,1) (1,-1)
y (1,-1) (-1,1)
Table IV. The Jamming Game in strategic form.
The reader can easily verify that the Jamming Game cannot
be solved by iterated strict or weak dominance. Moreover, this
game does not even admit a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In fact, there exists only a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
in this game that dictates each player to play a uniformly
random distribution strategy (i.e., select one of the channels
with probability 0.5).
13Let us emphasize that, according to the classic definition of a function in
calculus, the set of best response values does not correspond to a function,
because there might be several best responses to a given opponent strategy
profile.
6The importance of mixed strategies is further reinforced by
the following theorem of Nash [15, 16]. This theorem is a
crucial existence result in game theory. The proof uses the
Brouwer-Kakutani fixed-point theorem and is provided in [10].
Theorem 1 (Nash, 1950) Every finite strategic-form game
has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
2.5 Efficiency of Nash Equilibria and Equilib-
rium Selection
As we have seen so far, the first step in solving a game
is to investigate the existence of Nash equilibria. Theorem 1
states that in a broad class of games there always exists at
least a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, in some
cases, such as in the Jamming Game, there exists no pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Once we have verified that a Nash
equilibrium exists, we have to determine if it is a unique
equilibrium point. If there is a unique Nash equilibrium, then
we have to study its efficiency. One specific concept that
characterizes the efficiency of Nash equilibria is the price of
anarchy (POA) [12, 19]. The price of anarchy of a game is the
ratio between the sum of the payoffs of all players in a globally
optimal solution compared to the sum of the payoffs achieved
in a worst-case Nash equilibrium (or alternatively, how much
more cost does the Nash equilibrium bear with respect to the
globally optimal solution). If we consider the best-case Nash
equilibria instead of the worst-case Nash equilibria, then we
refer to the price of stability [19].
Efficiency can also be used to compare different Nash
equilibria and to select the most appropriate one. Equilibrium
selection means that the users have identified the desired Nash
equilibrium profiles, but they also have to coordinate which
one to choose. For example, in the Multiple Access Game both
players are aware that there exist three Nash equilibria with
different payoffs, but each of them tries to be “the winner” by
deciding to access the channel (in the expectation that the other
player will wait). Hence, their actions result in a profile that
is not a Nash equilibrium. The topic of equilibrium selection
is one of the active research fields in game theory [8, 20].
2.6 Pareto-Optimality
So far, we have seen how to identify Nash equilibria. We
have also seen that there might be several Nash equilibria, as in
the Joint Packet Forwarding Game. One method for identifying
the desired Nash equilibrium point in a game is to compare
strategy profiles using the concept of Pareto-optimality. To
introduce this concept, let us first define Pareto-superiority.
Definition 7 The strategy profile s is Pareto-superior to the
strategy profile s
′
if for any player i ∈ N :
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s
′
−i) (9)
with strict inequality for at least one player.
In other words, the strategy profile s is Pareto-superior
to the strategy profile s
′
, if the payoff of a player i can be
increased by changing from s
′
to s without decreasing the
payoff of other players. The strategy profile s
′
is defined as
Pareto-inferior to the strategy profile s. Note that the players
might need to change their strategies simultaneously to reach
the Pareto-superior strategy profile s.
Based on the concept of Pareto-superiority, we can identify
the most efficient strategy profile or profiles.
Definition 8 The strategy profile spo is Pareto-optimal (or
Pareto-efficient) if there exists no other strategy profile that
is Pareto-superior to spo.
In a Pareto-optimal strategy profile, one cannot increase the
payoff of player i without decreasing the payoff of at least
one other player. Using the concept of Pareto-optimality, we
can eliminate the Nash equilibria that can be improved by
changing to a more efficient (i.e. Pareto-superior) strategy
profile. The game can have several Pareto-optimal strategy
profiles and the set of these profiles is called the Pareto-
frontier. It is important to stress that a Pareto-optimal strategy
profile is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium.
We can now use the concept of Pareto-optimality to study
the efficiency of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in our running
examples.
• In the Forwarder’s Dilemma game, the Nash equilibrium
(D, D) is not Pareto-optimal. The strategy profiles (F ,
F ), (F , D) and (D, F ) are Pareto-optimal, but not Nash
equilibria.
• In the Joint Packet Forwarding game, both strategy pro-
files (F , F ) and (D, D) are Nash equilibria, but only (F ,
F ) is Pareto-optimal.
• In the Multiple Access Game, both pure-strategy profiles
(A, W ) and (W , A) are Nash equilibria and Pareto-
optimal.
• In the Jamming game, there exists no pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, and all strategy profiles are Pareto-optimal
(because it is a zero-sum game).
We have seen that the Multiple Access Game has three
Nash equilibria. We can notice that the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium σ = (q1 = 1 − C, q2 = 1 − C) results in
the expected payoffs (0, 0). Hence, this mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium is Pareto-inferior to the two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. In fact, it can be shown in general that there exists
no mixed strategy profile that is Pareto-superior to all pure
strategy profiles, because any mixed strategy of a player i
is a linear combination of his pure-strategies with positive
coefficients that sum up to one.
3 DYNAMIC GAMES
In the strategic-form representation it is usually assumed
that the players make their moves simultaneously without
knowing what the other players do. This might be a reasonable
assumption in some problems, for example in the Multiple
Access Game. In most of the games, however, the players
might have a sequential interaction, meaning that the move of
one player is conditioned by the move of the other player (i.e.,
the second mover knows the move of the first mover before
making his decision). These games are called dynamic games
7and we can represent them in an extensive form. We refer to
a game with perfect information, if the players have a perfect
knowledge of all previous moves in the game at any moment
they have to make a new move.
3.1 Extensive Form with Perfect Information
In the extensive form, the game is represented as a tree,
where the root of the tree is the start of the game and shown
with an empty circle. We refer to one level of the tree as a
stage. The nodes of a tree, denoted by n and a filled circle,
show the possible unfolding of the game, meaning that they
represent the sequence relation of the moves of the players.
This sequence of moves defines a path on the tree and is
referred to as the history h of the game. It is generally assumed
that a single player can move when the game is at a given
node.14 This player is represented as a label on the node. Note
that this is a tree, thus each node is a complete description of
the path preceding it (i.e., each node has a unique history). The
moves that lead to a given node are represented on each branch
of the tree. Each terminal node (i.e., leaf) of the tree defines a
potential end of the game called outcome and it is assigned the
corresponding payoffs. In addition, we consider finite-horizon
games, which means that there exist a finite number of stages.
Otherwise, we call it an infinite-horizon game.
Note that the extensive form is a more convenient repre-
sentation, but basically every extensive form can be trans-
formed to a strategic form and vice versa. However, extensive-
form games can be used to describe sequential interactions
more easily than strategic-form games. In extensive form,
the strategy of player i assigns a move mi(h(n)) to every
non-terminal node in the game tree with the history h where
player i has to move. The strategies define a Nash equilibrium,
which definition is basically the same as the one provided
in Definition 5. For simplicity, we use pure strategies in this
section.
To illustrate these concepts, let us consider the Sequential
Multiple Access Game. This is a modified version of the
Multiple Access Game supposing that p1 always moves first
(i.e., accesses or not) and p2 observes the move of p1 before
making his own move.15 We show this extensive form game
with perfect information in Figure 5. In this game, the strategy
of player p1 is to access the channel (A) or to wait (W ).
But the strategy of player p2 has to define a move given the
previous move for player p1. Thus, the possible strategies of p2
are AA, AW , WA and WW , where for example AW means
that player p2 accesses if p1 does the same and he waits if
p1 waits as well. Thus, we can identify the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in the Sequential Multiple Access Game. It turns out
that there exist three pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (A, WA),
(A, WW ) and (W , AA).
Kuhn formulated a relevant existence theorem about Nash
equilibria in finite extensive-form games in [13]. The intuition
14Osborne and Rubinstein [17] define a game where a set of players can
move in one node. Also, there exist specific examples in [9], in which different
players move in the same stage. For the clarity of presentation, we do not
discuss these specific examples in this tutorial.
15In fact, this is called the carrier sense and it is the basic technique in the
CSMA/CA protocols [18, 21].
p1
A
A
W
W
(-C,-C) (1-C,0)(0,1-C)
A W
(0,0)
p2 p2
Figure 5. The Sequential Multiple Access Game in extensive form.
of the proof is provided in [9].
Theorem 2 (Kuhn, 1953) Every finite extensive-form game
of perfect information has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof relies on the concept of backward induction,
which we introduce in the following.
3.2 Backward Induction
We have seen that there exist three Nash equilibria in the
Sequential Multiple Access Game. For example, if player p2
plays the strategy AA, then the best response of player p1 is
to play W . Let us notice, however, that the claim of player
p2 to play AA is an incredible (or empty) threat. Indeed, AA
is not the best strategy of player p2 if player p1 chooses A in
the first round.
In games with perfect information, we can eliminate equi-
libria based on such incredible threats using the technique of
backward induction. Let us first solve the Sequential Multi-
ple Access Game presented in Figure 5 with the backward
induction method as shown in Figure 6.
p1
A
A
W
W
(-C,-C)(1-C,0) (0,1-C)
A W
(0,0)
p2 p2
Figure 6. The backward induction solution of the Sequential Multiple Access
Game in extensive form.
The Sequential Multiple Access Game is a finite game with
complete information. Hence, player p2 knows that he is the
player that has the last move. For each possible history, he
predicts his best move. For example, if the history is h = A
in the game, then player p2 concludes that the move W results
in the best payoff for him in the last stage. Similarly, player p2
defines A as his best move following the move W of player
p1. In Figure 6, similarly to the examples in [10], we represent
these best choices with thick solid lines in the last game row.
Given all the best moves of player p2 in the last stage, player
p1 calculates his best moves as well. In fact, each reasoning
step reduces the extensive form game by one stage. Following
this backward reasoning, we arrive at the beginning of the
8game (the root of the extensive-form tree). The continuous
thick line from the root to one of the leaves in the tree gives
us the backward induction solution. In the Sequential Multiple
Access Game, we can identify the backward induction solution
as h = {A,W}. Backward induction can be applied to any
finite game of perfect information. This technique assumes
that the players can reliably forecast the behavior of other
players and that they believe that the other can do the same.
Note, however, that this argument might be less compelling
for longer extensive-form games due to the complexity of
prediction. Note that the technique of backward induction is
analogous to the technique of iterated strict dominance in
strategic-form games. It is an elimination method for reducing
the game.
Let us now derive the backward induction solution in the
Sequential Multiple Access Game by considering how player
p1 argues. If p1 chooses A, then the best response for p2 is to
play WW or WA, which results in the payoff of 1 − C for
p1. However, if p1 chooses Q, then the best response of p2 is
WA or AA, which results in the payoff of zero for p1. Hence,
p1 will choose A and (A, WA) or (A, WW ) are the backward
induction solutions in the Sequential Multiple Access Game.
Let us now briefly discuss the extensive form of the other
three wireless networking examples with sequential moves. In
the extensive-form version of the Forwarder’s Dilemma, the
conclusions do not change. Both players will drop each others’
packets. In the extensive form of the Joint Packet Forwarding
Game, if player p1 chooses D, then the move of player p2 is
irrelevant. Hence by induction, we deduce that the backward
induction solution is (F , F ). Finally, in the Jamming Game,
let us assume that p1 is the leader and the jammer p2 is the
follower. In this case, the jammer can easily observe the move
of p1 and jam.
3.3 Extensive Form with Imperfect Information
In this section, we will extend the notions of history and
information. As we have seen, in the game with perfect
information, the players always know the moves of all the
other players when they have to make their moves. However,
in the examples with simultaneous moves (e.g., the static
games in Section 2), the players have imperfect information
about the unfolding of the game. To define perfect information
more precisely, let us first introduce the notion of information
set h(n), i.e. the amount of information the players have
at the moment they choose their moves in a given node n.
The information set h(n) is a partition of the nodes in the
game tree. The intuition of the information set is that a player
moving in n is uncertain if he is in node n or in some other
node n
′ ∈ h(n). The information set has to fulfill the following
additional properties: (i) if n, n
′ ∈ h(n), then the same player
i has to move in both n and n
′
, and (ii) player i must have
the same moves available in n and n
′
. We can now formally
define the concept of perfect information.16
Definition 9 The players have a perfect information in the
game if every information set is a singleton (meaning that
each player always knows the previous moves of all players
when he has to make his move).
It is not a coincidence that we use the same notation for
the information set as for the history. In fact, the concept
of information set is a generalized version of the concept of
history.
To illustrate these concepts, let us first consider the extensive
form of the original Multiple Access Game shown in Figure 7.
Recall that this is a game with imperfect information. The
dashed line represents the information set of player p2 at the
time he has to make his move. The set of nodes in the game
tree circumscribed by the dashed line means that player p2
does not know whether player p1 is going to access the channel
or not at the time he makes his own move, i.e. that they make
simultaneous moves.
p1
A
A
W
W
(-C,-C) (1-C,0)(0,1-C)
A W
(0,0)
p2 p2
Figure 7. The original Multiple Access Game in extensive form. It is a game
with imperfect information.
The strategy of player i assigns a move mi(h(n)) to every
non-terminal node n in the game tree with the information set
h(n). Again, we deliberately restrict the strategy space of the
players to pure strategies, but the reasoning holds for mixed
strategies as well [9, 17]. The possible strategies of each player
in the Multiple Access Game are to access the channel (A) or
to wait (W ). As we have seen before, both (A, W ) and (W ,
A) are pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Note that in this game,
player p2 cannot condition his move on the move of player
p1.
3.4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
As we have seen in Section 3.2, backward induction can
be used to eliminate incredible threats. Unfortunately, the
elimination technique based on backward induction cannot
always be used. To illustrate this, let us construct the game
called Multiple Access Game with Retransmissions and solve
it in the pure strategy space. In this game, the players play the
Sequential Multiple Access Game, and they play the Multiple
16Note that two well-established textbooks on game theory, [9] and [17],
have different definitions of perfect information. We use the interpretation of
[9], which we believe is more intuitive. The authors of [17] define, in Chapter
6 of their book, a game with simultaneous moves also as a game with perfect
information, where the players are substituted with a set of players, who
make their moves. Indeed, there seems to be no consensus in the research
community either.
9Access Game if there is a collision (i.e., they both try to access
the channel). We show the extensive form in Figure 8.
p1
A
A
W
W
(1-C,0) (0,1-C)
A W
(0,0)
p2 p2
p1
A
A
W
W
(-2C,-2C)
(1-2C,-C)
(-C,1-2C)
A W
(-C,-C)
p2 p2
Figure 8. The Multiple Access Game with Retransmissions in extensive
form. It is also a game with imperfect information.
Note that the players have many more strategies than before.
Player p1 has four strategies, because there exist two informa-
tion sets, where he has to move; and he has two possible
moves at each of these information sets. For example, the
strategy s1 = AW means that player p1 accesses the channel
at the beginning and he waits in the second Multiple Access
Game. Similarly, player p2 has 23 = 8 strategies, but they are
less trivial to identify. For example, each move in the strategy
s2 = WAA means the following: (i) the first move means
that player p2 waits if player p1 accessed, or (ii) p2 accesses
if p1 waited and (iii) p2 accesses in the last stage if they both
accessed in the first two stages. This example highlights an
important point: The strategy defines the moves for player i
for every information set in the game where player i moves,
even for those information sets that are not reached if the
strategy is played. The common interpretation of this property
is that the players may not be able to perfectly observe the
moves of each other and thus the game may evolve along a
path that was not expected. Alternatively, the players may have
incomplete information, meaning that they have certain beliefs
about the payoffs of other players and hence, they may try to
solve the game on this basis. These beliefs may not be precise
and so the unfolding of the game may be different from the
predicted unfolding. Game theory covers these concepts in the
notion of Bayesian games [9], but we do not present this topic
in our tutorial due to space constraints.
It is easy to see that the Multiple Access Game with
Retransmissions cannot be analyzed using backward induction,
because the Multiple Access Game in the second stage is
of imperfect information. To overcome this problem, Selten
suggested the concept called subgame perfection in [22, 11].
In Figure 8, the Multiple Access Game in the second stage
is a proper subgame of the Multiple Access Game with
Retransmissions. Let us now give the formal definition of a
proper subgame.
Definition 10 The game G
′
is a proper subgame of an
extensive-form game G if it consists of a single node in the
extensive-form tree and all of its successors down to the leaves.
Formally, if a node n ∈ G′ and n′ ∈ h(n), then n′ ∈ G′ . The
information sets and payoffs of the subgame G
′
are inherited
from the original game G: this means that n and n
′
are in the
same information set in G
′
if they are in the same information
set in G; and the payoff function of G
′
is the restriction of
the original payoff function to G
′
.
Now let us formally define the concept of subgame perfec-
tion. This definition reduces to backward induction in finite
games with perfect information.
Definition 11 The strategy profile s is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of a finite extensive-form game G if it is a Nash
equilibrium of any proper subgame G
′
of the original game
G.
One can check the existence of subgame perfect equilibria
by applying the one-deviation property.
Definition 12 The one-deviation property requires that there
must not exist any information set and any proper subgame,
in which a player i can gain by deviating from his subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy and conforming to it in other
information sets.
A reader somewhat familiar with dynamic programming
may wonder about the analogy between the optimization in
game theory and in dynamic programming [3]. Indeed, the
one-deviation property corresponds to the principle of opti-
mality in dynamic programming, which is based on backward
induction. Hence, strategy profile s is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of a finite extensive-form game G if the one-
deviation property holds.
Subgame perfection provides a method for solving the
Multiple Access Game with Retransmissions. We can simply
replace the Multiple Access Game subgame (the second one
with simultaneous moves) with one of his pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. Hence, we can obtain one of the game trees pre-
sented in Figure 9. Solving the reduced games with backward
induction, we can derive the following solutions. In the game
shown in Figure 9a, we have the subgame perfect equilibrium
(WW , AAA). In Figure 9b we obtain the subgame perfect
equilibria (AA, W ∗ W ), where ∗ means any move from
{A,W}.
Because any game is a proper subgame of itself, a subgame-
perfect equilibrium is necessarily a Nash equilibrium, but there
might be Nash equilibria in G that are not subgame-perfect.
In fact, the concept of Nash equilibrium does not require that
the one-deviation property holds. We leave it to the reader as
an exercise to verify that there are more Nash equilibria than
subgame-perfect equilibria in the Multiple Access Game with
Retransmissions.
As we have seen, subgame-perfect equilibria are a subset of
Nash equilibria. The concept of subgame perfection is often
used for selecting more credible Nash equilibria. Nonetheless,
subgame perfection has often been criticized with arguments
based on equilibrium selection (recall the issue from Sec-
tion 2.5). Many researchers point out that the players might
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A
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W
(-C,1-2C)(1-C,0)(0,1-C)
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(0,0)
p2 p2
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A
W
W
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(0,0)
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a) b)
Figure 9. Application of subgame perfection to the Multiple Access Game with Retransmissions. In a) the proper subgame is replaced by one of the Nash
equilibria of that game, namely (W , A). Solution b) represents the case, where the subgame is replaced by the other Nash equilibrium (A, W ). The thick
lines show the result of the backward induction procedure on the reduced game trees.
not be able to determine how to play if several Nash equilibria
exist in a given subgame. As an example, they might both play
A in the Multiple Access Game with Retransmissions in the
second subgame as well. This disagreement can result in an
outcome that is not an equilibrium according to the definitions
considered so far.
4 REPEATED GAMES
So far, we have assumed that the players interact only once
and we modeled this interaction in a static game in strategic
form in Section 2 and partially in Section 3. Furthermore,
we have seen the Multiple Access Game with Retransmis-
sions, which was a first example to illustrate repeated games,
although the number of stages was quite limited. As we
have seen in Section 3, the extensive form provides a more
convenient representation for sequential interactions. In this
section, we assume that the players interact several times
and hence we model their interaction using a repeated game.
Repeated games are a subset of dynamic games and can be
expressed in both strategic and extensive form. The analysis
of repeated games in extensive form is basically the same as
presented in Section 3, hence we focus on the strategic form in
this section. To be more precise, we consider repeated games
with observable actions and perfect recall: this means that
each player knows all the moves of others, and that each player
knows his own previous moves at each stage in the repeated
game.
4.1 Basic Concepts
In repeated games, the players interact several times. Each
interaction is called a stage. Note that the concept of stage is
similar to the one in extensive form, but here we assume that
the players make their moves simultaneously in each stage.
The set of players is defined similarly to the static game
presented in Section 2.1.
As a running example, let us consider the Repeated For-
warder’s Dilemma, which consists of the repetition of the
Forwarder’s Dilemma stage game. In such a repeated game, all
past moves are common knowledge at each stage t. The set of
the past moves at stage t is commonly referred to as the history
h(t) of the game. We call it a history (and not an information
set), because it is uniquely defined at the beginning of each
stage. Let us denote the move of player i in stage t by mi(t).
We can formally write the history h(t) as follows:
h(t) = {(m1(t), . . . ,m|N |(t)), . . . , (m1(0), . . . ,m|N |(0))}
(10)
For example, at the beginning of the third stage of the
Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma, if both players have always
cooperated so far, then the history is h(2) = {(F, F ), (F, F )}.
The strategy si defines a move for player i in the next stage
t + 1 for a given history h(t) of the game.17 As before, the
strategy of player i assigns a move mi(t) to every non-terminal
node in the game tree with the history h(t) where player i has
to move.
mi(t+ 1) = si(h(t)) (11)
Note that the initial history h(0) is an empty set. The strategy
si of player i must define a move mi(0) for the initially
empty history, which is called the initial move. For a moment,
suppose that the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma has two
stages. Then one example strategy of each player is FFFFF ,
where the entries of the strategy define the forwarding behavior
for the following cases: (i) in the first stage, i.e. as an initial
move, (ii) if the history was h(1) = {(F, F )}, (iii) if the
history was h(1) = {(F,D)}, etc. As we can notice, the
strategy space grows very quickly as the number of stages
increases: In the two-stage Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma,
we have |Si| = 25 = 32 strategies for each player i. Hence in
repeated games, it is typically infeasible to make an exhaustive
search for the best strategy and hence for Nash equilibria.
The payoff in the repeated game might change as well. In
repeated games, the users typically want to maximize their
payoff for the whole duration T of the game. Hence, they
maximize:
ui =
T∑
t=0
ui(t, s) (12)
where ui(t, s) denotes the stage payoff, i.e., the payoff player
i receives in stage t.
In some cases, the objective of the players in the repeated
game can be to maximize their payoffs only for the next stage
(i.e., as if they played a static game). We refer to these games
17Recall that in the static game, the strategy was a single move.
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as myopic games as the players are short-sighted optimizers.
If the players maximize their total payoff during the game, we
call it a long-sighted game.
Recall that we refer to a finite-horizon game if the number
of stages T is finite. Otherwise, we refer to an infinite-horizon
game. We will see in Section 4.3 that we can also model finite-
horizon games with an unpredictable end as an infinite-horizon
game with specific conditions.
4.2 Nash Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Games
Let us first solve the finite Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma
using the concept of Nash equilibrium. Assume that the
players are long-sighted and want to maximize their total
payoff (the outcome of the game). As we have seen, it is
computationally infeasible to calculate the Nash equilibria
based on strategies that are mutual best responses to each
other as the number of stages increases. Nevertheless, we can
apply the concept of subgame perfection as we have learned
in Section 3.4. Because the game is of complete information,
the players know the end of it. Now, in the last stage game,
they both conclude that their dominant strategy is to drop the
opponent’s packet (i.e., to play D). Given this argument, their
best strategy is to play D in the penultimate stage. Following
the same argument, this technique of backward induction
dictates that the players should choose a strategy that plays
D in every stage. Note that many strategies exist with this
property.
In repeated games in general, it is computationally infeasible
to consider all possible strategies for every possibly history,
because the strategy space increases exponentially with the
length of the game. Hence, one usually restricts the strategy
space to a reasonable subset. One widely-used family of
strategies is the strategies of history-1. These strategies take
only the moves of the opponents in the previous stage into
account (meaning that they are “forgetful” strategies, because
they “forget” the past behavior of the opponent). In the games
we have considered thus far, we have two players and hence
the history-1 strategy of player i in the repeated game can be
expressed by the initial move mi(0) and the following strategy
function:
mi(t+ 1) = si(mj(t)) (13)
Accordingly, we can define the strategies in the Repeated
Forwarder’s Dilemma as detailed in Table V. Note that these
strategies might enable a feasible analysis in general, i.e., if
there exists a large number of stages.
We can observe that in the case of some strategies, such
as All-D or All-C, the players do not condition their next
move on the previous move of the opponents. One refers
to these strategies as non-reactive strategies. Analogously,
the strategies that take the opponents’ behavior into account
are called reactive strategies (for example the TFT or STFT
strategies shown in Table V).
Let us now analyze the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma
assuming that the players use the history-1 strategies. We can
conclude the same result as with the previous analysis.
Theorem 3 In the finite-horizon Repeated Forwarder’s
Dilemma, the strategy profile (All-D, All-D) is a Nash equi-
librium.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. It is easy to see that
this theorem holds by applying backward induction arguments:
In the last stage, move D for the corresponding player strictly
dominates move F . Given this knowledge, the same argument
applies to the previous stage, etc. From this, it is clear that
AllD is the strategy that has to be played by both players.
Furthermore, the above Nash equilibrium is unique.
Let us now consider the finite repeated version of the
Multiple Access Game. Suppose that accessing the channel A
corresponds to defection (competitive behavior) and waiting
W corresponds to cooperation. Then, All-D for example
means to access the channel independently of the move of
the other player. As opposed to the two-stage Repeated For-
warder’s Dilemma, this game admits several Nash equilibria
in the history-1 strategy space: (All-D, All-C), (All-C, All-D),
(STFT, TFT) and (TFT, STFT). We leave the verification of
this claims as an exercise for the interested reader.
4.3 Infinite-Horizon Games with Discounting
In the game theory literature, infinite-horizon games with
discounting are used to model a finite-horizon game in which
the players are not aware of the duration of the game. Clearly,
this is often the case in strategic interactions, in particular in
networking operations. In order to model the unpredictable
end of the game, one decreases the value of future stage
payoffs. This technique is called discounting. In such a game,
the players maximize their discounted total payoff :
ui =
∞∑
t=0
ui(t, s) · δt (14)
where δ denotes the discounting factor. The discounting factor
δ determines the decrease of the value for future payoffs,
where 0 < δ < 1 (although in general, we can assume that δ
is close to one). The discounted total payoff expressed in (14)
is often normalized, and thus we call it the normalized payoff :
ui = (1− δ) ·
∞∑
t=0
ui(t, s) · δt (15)
The role of the factor 1− δ is to let the normalized payoff
of the repeated game be expressed in the same unit as the
static game. Indeed, with this definition, if the stage payoff
ui(t, s) = 1 for all t = 0, 1, ..., then the normalized payoff is
equal to 1, because
∑∞
t=0 δ
t = 11−δ .
We have seen that the Nash equilibrium in the finite Re-
peated Forwarder’s Dilemma was a non-cooperative one. Yet,
this rather negative conclusion should not affect our morale:
in most networking problems, it is reasonable to assume that
the number of iterations (e.g., of packet transmissions) is
very large and a priori unknown to the players. Therefore,
as discussed above, games are usually assumed to have an
infinite number of repetitions. And, as we will see, infinitely
repeated games can lead to more cooperative behavior.
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m1(0) m1(t)|m2(t) = F m1(t)|m2(t) = D strategy function s1 name of the strategy
D D D m1(t+ 1) = D Always Defect (All-D)
D F D m1(t+ 1) = m2(t) Suspicious Tit-For-Tat (STFT)
D D F m1(t+ 1) = m2(t) Suspicious Anti Tit-For-Tat (SATFT)
D F F m1(t+ 1) = F Suspicious Always Cooperate (S-All-C)
F D D m1(t+ 1) = D Nice Always Defect (Nice-All-D)
F F D m1(t+ 1) = m2(t) Tit-For-Tat (TFT)
F D F m1(t+ 1) = m2(t) Anti Tit-For-Tat (ATFT)
F F F m1(t+ 1) = F Always Cooperate (All-C)
Table V. History-1 strategies of player 1 in the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma. The entries in the first three columns represent: the initial move of player
p1, a move of player p1 to a previous move m2(t) = F of player p2, and the move of p1 as a response to m2(t) = D. The bar represents the alternative
move (e.g., F = D). As an example, let us highlight the TFT strategy, which begins the game with forwarding (i.e., cooperation) and then copies the behavior
of the opponent in the previous stage.
Consider the history-1 strategies All-C and All-D for the
players in the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma. Thanks to the
normalization in (15), the corresponding normalized payoffs
are exactly those presented in Table I. A conclusion similar to
the one we drew in Section 4.2 can be directly derived at this
time. The strategy profile (All-D, All-D) is a Nash equilibrium:
If the opponent always defects, the best response is All-D. A
sketch of proof is provided (for the Prisoner’s Dilemma) in
[9].
To show other Nash equilibria, let us first define the Trigger
strategy. If a player i plays Trigger, then he forwards in the
first stage and continues to forward as long as the other player
j does not drop. As soon as the opponent j drops his packet,
player i drops all packets for the rest of the game. Note that
Trigger is not a history-1 strategy. The Trigger strategy applies
the general technique of punishments.
If no players drops a packet, the payoffs corresponds to (F ,
F ) in Table I, meaning that it is equal to 1−C for each player.
If a player i plays mi(t) = D at stage t, his payoff will be
higher at this stage (because he will not have to face the cost
of forwarding), but it will be zero for all the subsequent stages,
as player j will then always drop. The normalized payoff of
player i will be equal to:
(1−δ) [(1 + δ + ...+ δt−1)(1− C) + δt · 1] = 1−C+δt(C−δ)
(16)
As C < δ (remember that, in general, C is very close to
zero, whereas δ is very close to one), the last term is negative
and the payoff is therefore smaller than 1−C. In other words,
even a single defection leads to a payoff that is smaller than
the one provided by All-C. Hence, a player is better off always
forwarding in this infinite-horizon game, in spite of the fact
that, as we have seen, the stage game only has (D, D) as
an equilibrium point. It can be easily proven that (Trigger,
Trigger) is a Nash equilibrium and that it is also Pareto-optimal
(the intuition for the latter is the following: there is no way for
a player to go above his normalized payoff of 1− C without
hurting his opponent’s payoff). Note that by similar arguments,
one can show that (TFT, TFT) is also a Pareto-optimal Nash
equilibrium, because it results in the payoff 1−C for each of
the players.
It is important to mention that the players cannot predict
the end of the game and hence they cannot exploit this
information. As mentioned in [9], reducing the information
or the strategic options (i.e., decreasing his own payoff) of
a player might lead to a better outcome in the game. This
uncertainty is the real reason that the cooperative equilibrium
appears in the repeated version of the Forwarder’s Dilemma
game.
4.4 The Folk Theorem
We will now explore further the mutual influence of the
players’ strategies on their payoffs. We will start by defining
the notion of minmax value (sometimes called the reservation
utility). The minmax value is the lowest stage payoff that
the opponents of player i can force him to obtain with
punishments, provided that i plays the best response against
them. More formally, it is defined as follows:
ui = min
s−i
[
max
si
ui(si, s−i)
]
(17)
This is the lowest stage payoff that the opponents can
enforce on player i. Let us denote by smin = {si,min, s−i,min}
the strategy profile for which the minimum is reached in (17).
We call the s−i,min the minmax profile against player i within
the stage game.
It is easy to see that player pi can obtain at least his
minmax value ui in any stage and hence we call feasible
payoffs the payoffs higher than the minmax payoff. In the
Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma, the feasible payoffs for any
player p1 are higher than 0. Indeed, by playing s1=All-D, he
is assured to obtain at least that value, no matter what the
strategy of p2 can be. Similar argument applies to player p2.
Let us graphically represent the feasible payoffs in Figure 10.
We highlight the convex hull of payoffs that are strictly non-
negative for both players as the set of feasible payoffs.
The notion of minmax what we have just defined refers to
the stage game, but it has a very interesting application in the
repeated game, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 4 Player i’s normalized payoff is at least equal to
ui in any Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game,
regardless of the level of the discount factor.
The intuition can be obtained again from the Repeated
Forwarder’s Dilemma: a player playing All-D will obtain a
(normalized) payoff of at least 0. The theorem is proven in
[9].
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u1
1
1
(1,-c)
(-c,1)
(0,0)
feasible payoffs
Figure 10. The feasible payoffs in the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma.
We are now in a position to introduce a fundamental
result, which is of high relevance to our framework: the Folk
Theorem.18
Theorem 5 (Folk Theorem) For every feasible payoff vector
u = {ui}i with ui > ui, there exists a discounting factor δ < 1
such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) there is a Nash equilibrium with
payoffs u.
The intuition is that if the game is long enough (meaning
that δ is sufficiently close to 1), the gain obtained by a player
by deviating once is outweighed by the loss in every subse-
quent period, when loss is due to the punishment (minmax)
strategy of the other players.
We have seen the application of this theorem in the in-
finite Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma. A player is deterred
from deviating, because the short term gain obtained by the
deviation (1 instead of 1 − C) is outweighed by the risk of
being minmaxed (for example using the Trigger strategy) by
the other player (provided that C < δ).
The reader might ask if punishing a deviation is always
a credible move for the non-deviating players. Indeed, the
punishment might be too costly and hence the players could
refrain from it. But, as Friedman showed in [7], the concept
of the Folk Theorem can be extended to subgame-perfect
equilibria.
5 DISCUSSION
One of the criticisms of game theory, as applied to the
modeling of human decisions, is that human beings are, in
practice, rarely fully rational. Therefore, modeling the decision
process by means of a few equations and parameters is
questionable. In wireless networks, the users do not interact
with each other on such a fine-grained basis as forwarding
one packet or access the channel once. Typically, they (or the
device manufacturer, or the network operator, if any) program
their devices to follow a protocol (i.e., a strategy) and it is
18This denomination of “folk” stems from the fact that this theorem was
part of the oral tradition of game theorists, before it was formalized. Strictly
speaking, we present the folk theorem for the discounting criterion. There exist
different versions of the folk theorem, each of them is proved by different
authors (as they are listed in [17] at end of Chapter 8).
reasonable to assume that they rarely reprogram their devices.
Hence, such a device can be modeled as a rational decision
maker. Yet, there are several reasons the application of game
theory to wireless networks can be criticized. We detail them
here, as they are usually never mentioned, for understandable
reasons, in research papers.
1) Payoff function and cost: The first issue is the notion of
payoff function: How important is it for a given user that a
given packet is properly sent or received? This very much
depends on the situation: the packet can be a crucial message,
or could just convey a tiny portion of a figure appearing
in a game. Likewise, the sensitivity to delay can also vary
dramatically from situation to situation.
Similarly, the definition of cost might be a complex issue
as well. In our examples (and in the state of the art in the
application of game theory to wireless networks), the cost
represents the energy consumption of the devices. In some
cases, however, a device can be power-plugged, thus its “cost”
could be neglected. Likewise, a device whose battery is almost
depleted probably has a different evaluation of cost than
when his battery is full. Furthermore, cost can include other
considerations than energy, such as the previously mentioned
delay or the consumed bandwidth.
2) Pricing and mechanism design: Mechanism design is
concerned with the question of how to lead the players to
a desirable equilibrium by changing (designing) some param-
eters of the game. In particular, pricing is considered to be a
good technique for regulating the usage of a scarce resource by
adjusting the costs of the players. Many network researchers
have contributed to this field. These contributions provide a
better understanding of specific networking mechanisms.
Yet it is not clear today, even for wired networks how
relevant these contributions are going to be in practice. Usually
the pricing schemes used in reality by operators are very
coarse-grained, because operators tend to charge based on
investment and personnel costs and on the pricing strategy of
their competitors, and not on the instantaneous congestion of
the network. If a part of the network is frequently congested,
they will increase the capacity (deploy more base stations,
more optical fibers, more switches) rather than throttle the
user consumption by pricing.
Hence, the only area where pricing has practical relevance is
probably for service provisioning among operators (e.g., rent-
ing transmission capacity); but very little has been published
so far on this topic.
3) Infinite-horizon games: As mentioned, games in network-
ing are usually assumed to be of infinite horizon, in order
to capture the idea that a given player does not know when
the interaction with another player will stop. This is, however,
not perfectly true. For example, a given player/device could
“know” that he/it is about to be turned off and moved away
(e.g., his/its owner is about to finish a given session for which
the player has been attached at a given access point). Yet we
believe this not to be a real problem: indeed, the required
“knowledge” is clearly related to the application layer, whereas
the games we are considering involve networking mechanisms
(and thus are typically related to the MAC and network layers).
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4) Discounting factor: As we have seen, in the case of
infinitely repeated games, it is common practice to make use of
the discounting factor. This notion comes from the application
of game theory to economics: a given capital at time t0 has
“more value” than the same amount at a later time t1 because,
between t0 and t1, this capital can generate some (hopefully
positive) interest. At first sight, transposing this notion into the
realm of networking makes sense: a user wants to send (or to
receive) information as soon as he expresses the wish to do
so.
But this may be a very rough approximation, and the
comment we made about the payoff function can be applied
here as well: The willingness to wait before transmitting a
packet heavily depends on the current situation of the user and
on the content of the packet. In addition, in some applications
such as audio or video streaming, the network can forecast
how the demand will evolve.
A more satisfactory interpretation of the discounting factor
in our framework is related to the uncertainty that there will
be a subsequent iteration of the stage game, for example, con-
nectivity to an access point can be lost. With this interpretation
in mind, the discounting factor represents the probability that
the current round is not the last one.
It is important to emphasize that the average discounted
payoff is not the only way to express the payoff in an infinitely
repeated game. Osborne and Rubinstein [17] discuss other
techniques, such as “Limit of Means” and “Overtaking”. But,
none of them captures the notion of users’ impatience, and
hence we believe that they are therefore less appropriate for
our purpose.
5) Reputation: In some cases, a player can include the repu-
tation of another player in order to anticipate his moves. For
example, a player observed to be non-cooperative frequently
in the past is likely to continue to be so in the future. If
the game models individual packet transmissions, this attitude
would correspond to the suspicion that another player has been
programmed in a highly “selfish” way. These issues go beyond
the scope of this tutorial. For a discussion of these aspects, the
reader is referred to [9], Chapter 9.
6) Cooperative vs. non-cooperative players: In this tutorial,
we assume that each player is a selfish individual, who
is engaged in a non-cooperative game with other players.
We do not cover the concept of cooperative games, where
the players might have an agreement on how to play the
game. Cooperative games include the issues of bargaining and
coalition formation. These topics are very interesting and some
of our problems could be modeled using these concepts. Due
to space limitation, the reader interested in cooperative games
is referred to [17].
7) Information: In this thesis, we mostly study games with
complete information. This means that each player knows
the identity of other players, their strategy functions and the
resulting payoffs or outcomes. In addition, we consider games
with observable actions and perfect recall. In wireless net-
working, these assumptions might not hold: For example, due
to the unexpected changes of the radio channel, a given player
may erroneously reach the conclusion that another player is
behaving selfishly. This can trigger a punishment (assuming
there is one), leading to the risk of further retaliation, and
so on. This means that, for any design of a self-enforcement
protocol, special care must be devoted to the assessment
of the amount and accuracy of the information that each
player can obtain. The application of games with incomplete
and imperfect information is an emerging field in wireless
networking, with very few papers published so far.
8) Publication:: [6]
6 CONCLUSION
In this tutorial, we have demonstrated how non-cooperative
game theory can be applied to wireless networking. Using
four simple examples, we have shown how to capture wireless
networking problems in a corresponding game, and we have
analyzed them to predict the behavior of players. We have
deliberately focused on the basic notions of non-cooperative
game theory and have studied games with complete infor-
mation. We have modeled devices as players, but there can
be problems where the players are other participants, e.g.
network operators. In addition, there exists another branch of
game theory, namely cooperative game theory. We believe that,
due to the distributed nature of wireless networking, this is a
less appealing modeling tool in this context. Furthermore, we
did not discuss the advanced topic of games with incomplete
information, which are definitely a very compelling part of
game theory. The purpose of this tutorial is rather to guide
the interested readers familiar with computer science through
the basics of non-cooperative game theory and to help them
to bootstrap their own studies using this fascinating tool.
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